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This version was published on March 1, 2008
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1, 5-18 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0899764007300408

The Transaction Cost Theory of the Nonprofit Firm: Beyond Opportunism

Vladislav Valentinov

Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe

Building on the transaction cost theory of the for-profit firm, the article argues that the transaction cost-economizing role of the nonprofit firm has two distinct dimensions. One of them consists of reducing the cost of searching for, processing, and communicating information and the other minimizes opportunistic behavior by means of aligning incentives of concerned stakeholders. So far, the transaction cost theory of the nonprofit firm has been emphasizing the second dimension while largely ignoring the first one. The article fills this gap by demonstrating that nonprofit firms are able to economize on transaction cost not only by minimizing opportunism but also by facilitating cooperation among those stakeholders who derive utility from contributing to the realization of their nonprofit firm's missions and hence would not be interested in opportunistic behavior. The article concludes by emphasizing the complementarity of the two dimensions of the nonprofit firm's transaction cost-economizing role.

Key Words: nonprofit firm • transaction cost • information cost • opportunism


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